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Abstract
This paper examines necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
dynamic Groves mechanisms when the domain of valuations is restricted. Our
approach is to appropriately define the total valuation function, which is the
expected discounted sum of each period’s valuation function from the allocation
and thus a dynamic counterpart of the static valuation function, and then to port
the results for static Groves mechanisms to the dynamic setting.
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1 Introduction
The Groves mechanisms hold enormous theoretical value in mechanism design the-
ory. They are outcome efficient and dominant strategy incentive compatible, that is, they
maximize the sum of players’ valuations from the allocation and induce truth-telling as a
dominant strategy equilibrium. Moreover, Green and Laffont (1977), Walker (1978), Holm-
stro¨m (1979) and Carbajal (2010) have shown that every outcome efficient and dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanism is a Groves mechanism. In particular, Green
and Laffont (1977) have proven the uniqueness result both for unrestricted domains and
for a restricted domain containing continuous valuation functions, whereas Walker (1978)
has proven the uniqueness result for the class of concave valuation functions on a convex
subset of a Euclidean space. Holmstro¨m (1979) has subsequently established a result for
any smoothly connected domain of valuation functions, which thus implies the previous re-
sults. Carbajal (2010) has provided a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness,
which naturally implies most of the previous results.1 Therefore, when searching for mech-
anisms that additionally satisfy other desirable properties, such as individual rationality
and budget balance, we can restrict our attention to Groves mechanisms.2
Given the importance of the uniqueness result, it is an interesting research agenda to
extend the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms to dynamic environments in which players’
private information evolves over time and decisions are made in each period.3 Cavallo
(2008) has extended the uniqueness result for unrestricted domains, following the method
of proof in Green and Laffont (1977). The purpose of the present paper is to investigate
whether the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms in dynamic environments continues to hold
1 With certain assumptions on the domain, Williams (1999) and Krishna and Perry (2000) have proven
the result that every outcome efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism is payoff-equivalent
to some Groves mechanism from an interim perspective.
2 Some authors use the term ‘efficiency’ to mean outcome efficiency. Others use efficiency to mean
outcome efficiency plus budget balance. We follow the latter convention. Thus, a mechanism is efficient
when it maximizes the sum of players’ valuations from the allocation and it does not run a monetary
deficit.
3 See Bergemann and Said (2010), Vohra (2012), Pavan (2017) and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2019)
for surveys on dynamic mechanism design literature.
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when the domain is further restricted.
In the next section, we carefully describe dynamic environments, and then define the
class of dynamic Groves mechanisms, which is a dynamic version of the class of static
Groves mechanisms, for Markovian environments and show that they are outcome efficient
and periodic ex-post incentive compatible. The class of dynamic Groves mechanisms en-
compasses the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010) as well as the
team mechanism of Athey and Segal (2013), two of the most famous mechanisms in the
dynamic mechanism design literature. In Section 3, we specify conditions for the restricted
domains of valuations and examine necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of
dynamic Groves mechanisms. Our approach is to appropriately define the total valuation
function, which is the expected discounted sum of each period’s valuation function from
the allocation and thus a dynamic counterpart of the static valuation function, and then
to port the results for static Groves mechanisms to the dynamic setting. In particular, we
port the recent results of Carbajal (2010) which provide a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms as well as a sufficient condition on restricted
domains. The final section contains a brief summary.
The uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms can be interpreted as a characteri-
zation of payoff equivalence for outcome efficient and periodic ex-post efficient dynamic
mechanisms. The payoff equivalence result is well-established in mechanism design liter-
ature: Representative works include, besides the papers mentioned above, Krishna and
Maenner (2001) and Milgrom and Segal (2002) for static environments and Pavan et al.
(2014), Skrzypacz and Toikka (2015) and Bergemann and Strack (2015) for dynamic en-
vironments. Compared to the payoff equivalence results for restricted domains in the dy-
namic mechanism design literature, the current paper deals with multi-dimensional type
spaces as well as periodic ex-post incentive compatibility.4
4 Other papers cited in this paragraph consider perfect Bayesian incentive compatibility and assume
that the type space is one-dimensional in each period, mainly due to their interest in revenue maximization
problem. Needless to say, these papers differ in other respects and also they are more general than the
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2 The Dynamic Groves Mechanism
2.1. The environment
There is a set I = {1, . . . , n} of players and a countably infinite number of periods,
indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. Player i’s type in period t is θti ∈ Θi. We assume that this is
private information. Let θt = (θt1, . . . , θ
t
n) and Θ =
∏n
i=1Θi.
5 We assume that Θ is a Borel
space, i.e., a Borel subset of a complete and separable metric space. Let B(Θ) be the Borel
σ-algebra on Θ. After θt ∈ Θ is realized in period t, a public action at ∈ A is determined.
We assume that A is a Borel space, with the Borel σ-algebra B(A).6 In addition, let
zti ∈ IR be a monetary transfer from player i in period t. Given sequences (θ
0, θ1, . . .) of
type profiles and (a0, a1, . . .) of actions, together with (z0i , z
1
i , . . .) of i’s monetary transfers,
player i’s total payoff is
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
vi(θ
t
i , a
t)− zti
)
,
where (i) δ is a common discount factor and δ < 1, and (ii) vi(·) is a measurable (one-
period) valuation function. The valuation function is usually called as the reward function
in the Markov decision process literature. Note that we deal with the private-values envi-
ronment in that player i’s valuation function depends only on player i’s type but not other
players’ types. Note also that we deal with the time-separable environment in that this
function depends only on player i’s type in the current period but not other periods. We
assume that vi(·) is bounded, that is, |vi(θi, a)| ≤ C <∞ for all θi and a.
The dynamic evolution of players’ types is represented by a stochastic kernel. Let
p(B|θt, at) for B ∈ B(Θ) be the conditional probability that the type profile lies in B
in period t + 1 when the type profile is θt and the action is at in period t. We have
current paper in other aspects. Please refer to the original papers for details. Please refer also to Carbajal
(2010) for a discussion on the significance of his results in comparison to other payoff equivalence results
in static mechanism design.
5 We may include public information, say θt
0
∈ Θ0, to be more realistic. We dispense with this
additional notation for clearer presentation of the main idea.
6 We impose the assumption that Θ and A are Borel spaces to employ some of the results in Herna´ndez-
Lerma and Lasserre (1996). See footnotes 9 and 11.
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(i) p(·|θt, at) is a probability measure on Θ for each fixed (θt, at), and (ii) p(B|·, ·) is a
measurable function with respect to the product σ-algebra B(Θ × A) for each fixed B ∈
B(Θ). We assume that p(·|·, ·) is independent across players in the sense that p(θ′|θ, a) =
∏n
i=1 pi(θ
′
i|θi, a). Observe that, except for the fact that θ is private information, this
environment fits into a Markov decision process with Θ being the set of states.
2.2. The general mechanism and the outcome efficient policy
We focus attention on dynamic direct mechanisms that ask each player to report his
type (i.e., state) in each period and these reports are publicly observable. Let rti denote
player i’s report in period t, which may or may not be equal to his true type θti . Let
hti = (θ
0
i , r
0, a0, θ1i , r
1, a1, . . . , θt−1i , r
t−1, at−1, θti)
be a private history of player i in period t, where rs = (rs1, . . . , r
s
n) for s = 0, . . . , t− 1 is a
report profile, and let Hti be the set of all such histories. A (pure) strategy for player i in
period t is a measurable function rˆti : H
t
i → Θi. A strategy is truth-telling if rˆ
t
i(h
t
i) = θ
t
i
for all hti. In addition, let
ht = (r0, a0, r1, a1, . . . , rt−1, at−1, rt)
be a public history in period t and let Ht be the set of all such histories. Observe that,
when players adopt the truth-telling strategy, the private histories do not contain more in-
formation than the public histories on the equilibrium path. Since we are mainly concerned
with incentive compatible mechanisms in which the truth-telling strategy is an equilibrium,
we will henceforth not distinguish between true states and reported states (mainly to save
notations) except when explicitly stating otherwise.
In each period, the mechanism decides the action based on the actions chosen up to
the previous period and the reports up to the beginning of the current period. Thus, when
players adopt the truth-telling strategy, a deterministic (history-dependent) decision rule
of the mechanism in period t is a measurable function aˆt : Ht → A. A special class of
decision rule is the deterministic Markovian decision rule that chooses an action based
5
only on the current state, i.e., aˆt : Θ → A.7 Moreover, a randomized decision rule aˆt
specifies a probability distribution on the set of actions. Randomized decision rules may
be history-dependent or Markovian. A policy of the mechanism is a sequence of decision
rules, that is, a policy is pi = (aˆ0, aˆ1, . . .). Let Π be the set of all policies.
An outcome efficient policy is pi∗ ∈ Π that maximizes the expected discounted sum of
players’ valuations. That is,
pi∗ ∈ argmax
pi∈Π
Epiθ
[ ∞∑
t=0
δt
n∑
j=1
vj(θ˜
t
j, a˜
t)
]
for every θ ∈ Θ.8
In addition, the mechanism specifies the monetary transfers based on public histories.
A deterministic (history-dependent) transfer rule of the mechanism in period t is a collec-
tion of measurable functions {zˆti : H
t → IR}i∈I . Let zˆ
t = (zˆt1, . . . , zˆ
t
n). Markovian transfer
rules and randomized transfer rules can be defined similarly. In summary, a dynamic di-
rect mechanism is represented by a family of decision rules and monetary transfer rules,
{aˆt, zˆt}∞t=0.
We call a policy stationary if aˆt = aˆ for all t. A stationary policy has the form
pi = (aˆ, aˆ, . . .), which is denoted by aˆ∞. For the stationary environment considered in this
paper,9 we can restrict our attention to deterministic stationary policies when finding a
policy that maximizes the expected discounted sum of players’ valuations.10 An outcome
7 For the definition of Markovian decision rule, please refer to page 21 of Puterman (2005) or page 20
of Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre (1996). It is called Markovian since it induces a Markov process over
the states.
8 We will assume throughout that the relevant maximum is attained without specifying sufficient
conditions. This assumption is valid when A is compact, vi(θi, a) is bounded and upper-semicontinuous
on A for all θi, and p(θ
′|θ, a) is strongly continuous, i.e., g(θ, a) ≡
∫
Θ
f(θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a) is continuous and
bounded on Θ × A for every measurable bounded function f : Θ → IR. Other sufficient conditions may
also guarantee the existence of an outcome efficient policy pi∗. See Theorem 4.2.3 of Herna´ndez-Lerma
and Lasserre (1996) and the discussion preceding it.
9 The environment is stationary since both the valuation function vi(·) for all i and the stochastic
kernel p(·|·) do not vary with t.
10 See Theorem 4.2.3 of Herna´ndez-Lerma and Lasserre (1996). Note that a deterministic stationary
policy is a deterministic Markovian policy.
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efficient policy thus has the form pi∗ = (a∗)∞ where a∗ : Θ→ A. We can also restrict our
attention to stationary transfer rules.
2.3. The dynamic Groves mechanism
Define the total social welfare function W : Θ → IR recursively by the following
optimality equation (or Bellman equation):
W (θ) =
n∑
j=1
vj(θj, a
∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
W (θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ)).
Note that we define W (θ) along an outcome efficient policy pi∗ = (a∗)∞. We can also
define player i’s total valuation function Vi(θ) recursively as
Vi(θ) = vi(θi, a
∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
Vi(θ
′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ))
given pi∗ = (a∗)∞. Observe that
Vi(θ) =vi(θi, a
∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
vi(θ
′
i, a
∗(θ′))p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ))
+δ2
∫
Θ
∫
Θ
vi(θ
′′
i , a
∗(θ′′))p(dθ′′|θ′, a∗(θ′))p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ)) + · · · .
Likewise, we can define the total valuation function of players other than i recursively as
V−i(θ) =
∑
j 6=i
vj(θj, a
∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
V−i(θ
′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ))
given pi∗ = (a∗)∞. Note that we use the usual notational convention that the subscript −i
pertains to players other than i. Thus, θ−i = (θ1, . . . , θi−1, θi+1, . . . , θn), Θ−i =
∏
j 6=iΘj ,
and so on. We now define dynamic Groves mechanisms. We note that Cavallo (2008)
defined dynamic Groves mechanisms earlier.
Definition 1. A dynamic Groves mechanism is a dynamic direct mechanism with
an outcome efficient policy pi∗ = (a∗)∞ and a stationary total transfer rule for player
i = 1, . . . , n given as
Z∗i (θ) = −V−i(θ) + Φi(θ−i).
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Note that Φi(·) do not depend on θi. If we recall the terminology of d’Aspremont and
Ge´rard-Varet (1979), the dynamic Groves mechanism is a distribution mechanism since
the total transfer rule is given as the difference between V−i(θ) and the total distribution
rule Φi(θ−i). In addition, the total distribution rule Φi(θ−i) is discretionary because it
does not depend on θi.
Observe that player i’s total payoff in a dynamic Groves mechanism is Vi(θ)−Z
∗
i (θ) =
W (θ)− Φi(θ−i). Let
Yi(θ) =W (θ)− Φi(θ−i).
We can define player i’s (one-period) payoff yi(θ) by the identity
Yi(θ) = yi(θ) + δ
∫
Θ
Yi(θ
′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ)).
We can also define Φi(θ−i) in terms of player i’s (one-period) distribution rule φi : Θ−i →
IR and a given deterministic Markovian decision rule aˆi : Θ−i → A as
Φi(θ−i) = φi(θ−i) + δ
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i)),
that is,
Φi(θ−i) =φi(θ−i) + δ
∫
Θ
−i
φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))
+δ2
∫
Θ
−i
∫
Θ
−i
φi(θ
′′
−i)p(dθ
′′
−i|θ
′
−i, aˆi(θ
′
−i))p(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i)) + · · · .
Thus,
yi(θ) =W (θ)− Φi(θ−i)− δ
∫
Θ
(
W (θ′)− Φi(θ
′
−i)
)
p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ))
=
n∑
j=1
vj(θj, a
∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
W (θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ))
−φi(θ−i)− δ
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))
−δ
∫
Θ
W (θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(θ)) + δ
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, a
∗(θ))
=
n∑
j=1
vj(θj, a
∗(θ))− φi(θ−i)
+δ
(∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, a
∗(θ))−
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))
)
.
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Then, the (one-period) monetary transfer rule z∗i : Θ→ IR of a dynamic Groves mechanism
can be defined as
z∗i (θ) =vi(θi, a
∗(θ))− yi(θ)
=φi(θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(θj, a
∗(θ))
+δ
(∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))−
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, a
∗(θ))
)
.
Note that the transfer z∗i (θ) depends on the report of player i only through the determi-
nation of the action a∗(θ), which is a prominent feature of the static Groves mechanisms.
Observe that we may alternatively define dynamic Groves mechanisms using the (one-
period) monetary transfer rule as follows:
Definition 1′. A dynamic Groves mechanism is a dynamic direct mechanism with an
outcome efficient policy pi∗ = (a∗)∞ and a stationary monetary transfer rule for player
i = 1, . . . , n given as
z∗i (θ) =φi(θ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(θj, a
∗(θ))
+δ
(∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))−
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, a
∗(θ))
)
,
where φi : Θ−i → IR is player i’s (one-period) distribution rule, aˆi : Θ−i → A is a given
deterministic Markovian decision rule, and Φi : Θ−i → IR is defined recursively as
Φi(θ−i) = φi(θ−i) + δ
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i)).
Two special instances of dynamic Groves mechanisms are outstanding. Firstly, if
φi(θ−i) = 0 and so Φi(θ−i) = 0 for all i and θ−i, then Yi(θ) becomesW (θ). This mechanism
is called the team mechanism by Athey and Segal (2013). Secondly, if aˆi : Θ−i → A is given
as the deterministic decision rule a∗−i : Θ−i → A that maximizes the expected discounted
9
sum Epiθ [
∑∞
t=0 δ
t
∑
j 6=i vj(θ˜
t
j , a˜
t)] of the valuations of players other than i, and φi(θ−i) is
given as
∑
j 6=i vj(θj, a
∗
−i(θ−i)), thus Φi(θ−i) is equal to
W−i(θ−i) =
∑
j 6=i
vj(θj , a
∗
−i(θ−i)) + δ
∫
Θ
−i
W−i(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, a
∗
−i(θ−i)),
then Yi(θ) becomes player i’s total marginal contribution W (θ)−W−i(θ−i).
11 This mech-
anism is called the dynamic pivot mechanism by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2010).
It is easy to establish that dynamic Groves mechanisms are periodic ex-post incentive
compatible, that is, the truth-telling strategy is a best response for every player i and every
true type profile θ in every period t and private history hti.
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Theorem 1. A dynamic Groves mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible.
Proof: By the unimprovability principle, it is sufficient to show that player i does not have
an incentive to ‘deviate now and then follow the truth-telling strategy afterwards.’ Let
Yi(ri, θ−i|θi) be player i’s total payoff when the true type profile is (θi, θ−i) but i reports
ri this period. Then,
13
Y (ri, θ−i|θi) =
n∑
j=1
vj(θj, a
∗(ri, θ−i))− φi(θ−i)
+δ
∫
Θ
W (θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(ri, θ−i))− δ
∫
Θ
−i
Φi(θ
′
−i)p−i(dθ
′
−i|θ−i, aˆi(θ−i))
=
n∑
j=1
vj(θj, a
∗(ri, θ−i)) + δ
∫
Θ
W (θ′)p(dθ′|θ, a∗(ri, θ−i))− Φi(θ−i)
.
Observe that Yi(θi, θ−i|θi) = Yi(θ) = W (θ) − Φi(θ−i) ≥ Yi(ri, θ−i|θi) by the definition of
W (θ), so a dynamic Groves mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible. Q.E.D.
11 Note that W−i(θ−i) is different from V−i(θ) defined above.
12 Since it is rather cumbersome to spell out the exact definition of ex-post incentive compatibility, we
present it in the appendix.
13 Note well that the transition probability p depends on the (true) type profile θ and the action a,
but not directly on the report profile r. It depends on r indirectly through a.
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3 The Uniqueness Results
To establish the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms, we consider a particular
class of deviations called consistent deviations.14 Note that a deviation in a dynamic
mechanism is any (reporting) strategy rˆti : H
t
i → Θi different from the prescribed strategy.
Thus, a deviation in an incentive compatible mechanism is any strategy in which the player
misreports his true type in a single or multiple periods. In a consistent deviation, after
player i misreports θ¯i when his true type is θi in this period, he keeps misreporting in
all future periods. Hence, a consistent deviation is not a local deviation at one point in
time, but rather represents a global deviation in the sense that the player changes his
reports at every point in time. Note that the mechanism as well as other players cannot
distinguish a consistent deviation from the true type realizations starting from θ¯i. That is,
the same sequences of public decisions and monetary transfers are obtained. Hence, the
same expectation operator is applied to the total payoffs of other players.
It is a standard fact that, given an outcome efficient policy pi∗ = (a∗)∞ where a∗ :
Θ → A, we can describe the Markov process {{θti}
∞
t=0}
n
i=1 represented by the stochastic
kernel p(θt+1|θt, a∗(θt)) =
∏n
i=1 pi(θ
t+1
i |θ
t
i , a
∗(θt)) alternatively as a dynamical system
θt+1i = ki(θ
t
i , a
∗(θt), ωt+1i )
for all i ∈ N and t ∈ {0, 1, · · ·}, where ki : Θi × A × Ωi → Θi is a measurable mapping
and {ωti}
∞
t=1 is a sequence of independently and identically distributed Ωi-valued random
variables for some measurable space Ωi, and independent of the initial type θ
0
i .
Definition 2. A consistent deviation is a deviation in which, after player i misreports
14 This class of deviations is considered in Pavan et al. (2014), Bergemann and Strack (2015), and Eso¨
and Szentes (2017). It is instrumental in rendering the dynamic mechanism design problem tractable.
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θ¯0i in period 0 when his true type is θ
0
i , he keeps misreporting in all periods as
θ
1
i = ki(θ¯
0
i , a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω
1
i ),
θ¯2i = ki(θ¯
1
i , a
∗(θ¯1i , θ
1
−i), ω
2
i )
= ki(ki(θ¯
0
i , a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω
1
i ), a
∗(ki(θ¯
0
i , a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω
1
i ), θ
1
−i), ω
2
i ),
and so on. That is, the report in period t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·} is recursively given as
θ¯ti = ki(θ¯
t−1
i , a
∗(θ¯t−1i , θ
t−1
−i ), ω
t
i).
We are ready to define several total functions using consistent deviations. Given θ0 =
(θ01, · · · , θ
0
n) and ω = (ω1, · · · , ωn) where ωi = {ω
t
i}
∞
t=1, let θ
1
i = ki(θ
0
i , a
∗(θ0i , θ
0
−i), ω
1
i ), θ¯
1
i =
ki(θ¯
0
i , a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω
1
i ), θ
2
i = ki(θ
1
i , a
∗(θ1i , θ
1
−i), ω
2
i ), θ¯
2
i = ki(θ¯
1
i , a
∗(θ¯1i , θ
1
−i), ω
2
i ), and so on for
all θti and θ¯
t
i for t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·}. Define
V Di (θ
0
i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω) =
∞∑
t=0
δtvi(θ
t
i , a
∗(θ¯ti , θ
t
−i))
and
V Ci (θ
0
i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
δtvi(θ
t
i , a
∗(θ¯ti , θ
t
−i))
]
where the expectation is taken over ω. We also define
V D−i(θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i), ω) =
∞∑
t=0
δt
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
t
j , a
∗(θ¯ti , θ
t
−i)),
V C−i(θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
δt
∑
j 6=i
vj(θ
t
j , a
∗(θ¯ti , θ
t
−i))
]
,
ZDi (θ¯
0
i , θ
0
−i, ω) =
∞∑
t=0
δtzi(θ¯
t
i , θ
t
−i) and Z
C
i (θ¯
0
i , θ
0
−i) = E
[
ZDi (θ¯
0
i , θ
0
−i)
]
.
Note that these functions do not depend on θ0i . Define
UCi (θ
0
i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)) = V
C
i (θ
0
i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i))− Z
C
i (θ¯
0
i , θ
0
−i)
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and
WC(θ0i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)) = V
C
i (θ
0
i , θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)) + V
C
−i(θ
0
−i, a
∗(θ¯0i , θ
0
−i)).
Observe that, since the environment is stationary and Markov, it does not matter whether
the period begins in t = 0 or any t = 0, 1, · · ·. Hence, we will drop the superscript for t = 0
and write V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) and so on. Observe also that V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) =
Vi(θi, θ−i) where the latter is defined in Section 2. Likewise, V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) =
V−i(θi, θ−i) and W
C(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) = W (θi, θ−i). Let Zi(θi, θ−i) = Z
C
i (θi, θ−i) and
Ui(θi, θ−i) = Vi(θi, θ−i)− Zi(θi, θ−i).
Having defined these total functions, we henceforth follow Carbajal (2010) as closely
as possible to demonstrate that many of the results for the dynamic setting can be obtained
by porting the corresponding results of the static mechanism design. We need additional
assumptions. First, assume that Θi is an open connected subset of IR
ki . Next, assume
that the domain Vi of player i’s total valuations consists of V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))’s that
are equi-Lipschitz continuous and regular on Θi.
A family of functions {V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) : Θi → IR|θ−i ∈ Θ−i, θ¯i ∈ Θi} is equi-
Lipschitz continuous on Θi if there exists a non-negative number Li such that
|V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))− V
C
i (θˆi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))| ≤ Li||θi − θˆi||
for all θi, θˆi, θ−i, and θ¯i. As for regularity, given an open set Y ⊆ IR
k and a function g on
Y to IR, the one-sided directional derivative of g at y ∈ Y in the direction of d ∈ IRk is
defined as D+g(y; d) = limλ↓0 [g(y+λd)−g(y)]/λ, provided this limit exists. The function
g is regular at y ∈ Y if it admits one-sided directional derivatives at y in any direction d,
and g is regular on Y if it is regular at every y ∈ Y . Please refer to Carbajal (2010) for
a more detailed discussion of these concepts. These assumptions in particular imply that
the following limits exist and are finite:15
15 Observe that D−
θi
V C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i); d) = −D
+
θi
V C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i);−d).
13
D+
θi
V C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i); d) = lim
λ↓0
V C
i
(θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))− V
C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))
λ
, ∀d ∈ IRki ,
D−
θi
V C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i); d) = lim
λ↑0
V C
i
(θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))− V
C
i
(θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))
λ
, ∀d ∈ IRki .
We note that the conditions on V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) are imposed only with respect
to the outcome efficient decision rule a∗(·), not with respect to any possible decision rule
aˆ(·). We also note that the conditions on V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) can be passed over to
the conditions on vi(θi, a) and p(B|θi, θ−i, a). For Lipschitz continuity of V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i,
θ−i)), it is sufficient to assume that both vi(θi, a) and p(B|θi, θ−i, a) are Lipschitz contin-
uous on Θi.
16 Similarly, for regularity of V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)), it is sufficient to assume
that vi(θi, a) is regular on Θi and that, for any θ ∈ Θ and any direction d ∈
∏n
i=1 IR
ki ,
lim
λ↓0
∫
Θ
w(θ′, a)p(dθ′|θ + λd, a)−
∫
Θ
w(θ′, a)p(dθ′|θ, a)
λ
exists and is finite for any function w(θ, a). Other conditions on vi(θi, a) and p(B|θi, θ−i, a)
may also lead us to the desired conditions on V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)). We first prove two
straightforward lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume that Θi is an open connected subset of IR
ki and that the domain Vi of
player i’s total valuations consists of V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))’s that are equi-Lipschitz con-
tinuous and regular on Θi. If a dynamic direct mechanism with an outcome efficient policy
pi∗ = (a∗)∞ and a stationary total transfer rule Zi : Θ → IR is periodic ex-post incen-
tive compatible, then Ui(θi, θ−i) and W (θi, θ−i) are Lipschitz continuous and differentiable
almost everywhere on Θi.
Proof: See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Assume that Θi is an open connected subset of IR
ki and that the domain
Vi of player i’s total valuations consists of V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))’s that are equi-Lipschitz
16 See, for instance, Dufour and Prieto-Rumeau (2012) for Lipschitz continuity of a stochastic kernel.
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continuous and regular on Θi. Let (pi
∗, {Zi}
n
i=1) be an outcome efficient and periodic ex-
post incentive compatible dynamic direct mechanism. Given any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, if W (θi, θ−i)
is regular at θi ∈ Θi, then for any direction d ∈ IR
ki we have
D+θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) ≤ D
+
θi
W (θi, θ−i; d),
D−θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) ≥ D
−
θi
W (θi, θ−i; d).
Proof: See the appendix. Q.E.D.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is that, if W (θi, θ−i) is differentiable at θi
so that D+θiW (θi, θ−i; d) = D
−
θi
W (θi, θ−i; d) at θi, then
D−θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) ≥ D
+
θi
V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d).
The reverse of this inequality is stated as a property.
Definition 3. A dynamic direct mechanism with an outcome efficient policy pi∗ = (a∗)∞
and a stationary total transfer rule Zi : Θ → IR satisfies Property A if, for every i, every
θ−i, and each θi such that W (θi, θ−i) is differentiable at θi, we have
D−θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) ≤ D
+
θi
V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d)
for any direction d ∈ IRki .
Note: This property corresponds to Property 1 of Carbajal (2010).
When this property is satisfied, Lemma 2 implies that D−θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) =
D+θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d) for any direction d ∈ IR
ki when W (θi, θ−i) is differentiable.
Hence, V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) admits two-sided derivatives with respect to θi, which is key
for the uniqueness result.
Theorem 2. Assume that Θi is an open connected subset of IR
ki and that the domain
Vi of player i’s total valuations consists of V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))’s that are equi-Lipschitz
continuous and regular on Θi. Then, any dynamic direct mechanism which is outcome
15
efficient and periodic ex-post incentive compatible is a dynamic Groves mechanism if and
only if it satisfies Property A.
Proof: For sufficiency, assume that Property A is satisfied, and let (pi∗, {Zi}
n
i=1) be an
outcome efficient and periodic ex-post incentive compatible dynamic direct mechanism.
Define ΦCi (θ¯i, θ−i) = Z
C
i (θ¯i, θ−i) + V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) for this mechanism. Define also
that Φi(θi, θ−i) = Φ
C
i (θi, θ−i). It suffices to show that Φ
C
i (θi, θ−i) = Φi(θi, θ−i) is constant
over Θi.
Fix θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Since Ui(θ) = Vi(θ)−Zi(θ) = Vi(θ)+V−i(θ)−Φ
C
i (θ) = W (θ)−Φ
C
i (θ),
we have ΦCi (θ) =W (θ)−Ui(θ) and so Φ
C
i (·, θ−i) is Lipschitz continuous and differentiable
almost everywhere on Θi by Lemma 1. We claim that for each direction d ∈ IR
ki , the two-
sided directional derivative of ΦCi (·, θ−i) in the direction of d, denoted by DθiΦ
C
i (·, θ−i; d),
is zero a.e. on Θi, from which it follows that Φ
C
i (·, θ−i) is constant over Θi. To see this,
fix d ∈ IRki and define, for each θi ∈ Θi, the auxiliary functions ψs and ψi on IR by
ψs(λ) =V
C
i (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) + V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))−W (θi + λd, θ−i),
ψi(λ) =V
C
i (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) + V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− Φ
C
i (θi, θ−i)
−Ui(θi + λd, θ−i).
Note that ψs(λ) ≤ 0 for any λ by definition of the total social welfare function W : Θ→ IR
and ψs(0) = 0. Similarly, ψi(λ) ≤ 0 for any λ by periodic ex-post incentive compatibility
and ψi(0) = 0.
Suppose θi is a type in Θi at which both W (·, θ−i) and Ui(·, θ−i) are differentiable.
Then, Property A implies that
0 ≤ lim
λ↑0
ψs(λ)− ψs(0)
λ
= D−θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d)−D
−
θi
W (θi, θ−i; d)
≤D+θiV
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i); d)−D
+
θi
W (θi, θ−i; d) = lim
λ↓0
ψs(λ)− ψs(0)
λ
≤ 0.
A similar argument holds if we use ψi above instead. It follows that, for almost every type
θi ∈ Θi, we have limλ→0 ψs(λ)/λ = limλ→0 ψi(λ)/λ = 0. Hence, a.e. on Θi,
DθiΦ
C
i (θi, θ−i; d) = lim
λ→0
ΦCi (θi + λd, θ−i)− Φ
C
i (θi, θ−i)
λ
= lim
λ→0
ψi(λ)− ψs(λ)
λ
= 0.
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Thus, for any direction d ∈ IRki , we have DθiΦ
C
i (θi, θ−i; d) = 0 almost everywhere on Θi
as claimed.
For necessity, assume that any dynamic direct mechanism which is outcome efficient
and periodic ex-post incentive compatible is a dynamic Groves mechanism. Fix an outcome
efficient and periodic ex-post incentive compatible dynamic direct mechanism (pi∗, {Zi}
n
i=1)
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i. Since this mechanism is a dynamic Groves mechanism, Φi(·, θ−i) is con-
stant over Θi. Hence, for any θi ∈ Θi and any direction d ∈ IR
ki , its two-sided directional
derivative vanishes, i.e., DθiΦi(θi, θ−i; d) = 0. With the auxiliary function ψs and ψi
defined above, we have
0 = lim
λ↑0
Φi(θi + λd, θ−i)− Φi(θi, θ−i)
λ
= lim
λ↑0
W (θi + λd, θ−i)− Ui(θi + λd, θ−i)− Φi(θi, θ−i)
λ
= lim
λ↑0
ψi(λ)− ψs(λ)
λ
= lim
λ↑0
[ψi(λ)− ψi(0)]− [ψs(λ)− ψs(0)]
λ
.
A similar argument holds if we let λ approach zero from above. These facts, together with
the regularity of the auxiliary functions at any θi where W (·, θ−i) and Ui(·, θ−i) admit
derivatives, imply that
D−ψi(0)−D
−ψs(0) = D
+ψi(0)−D
+ψs(0).
Observe now that ψi(0) = W (θi, θ−i) − Ui(θi, θ−i) − Φi(θi, θ−i). Thus, if W (·, θ−i)
and Ui(·, θ−i) are differentiable at θi, it follows that ψi is differentiable at 0, and hence
D−ψi(0) = D
+ψi(0). Then, from the equation above, ψs is also differentiable at 0. Using
the definition of ψs, we know that the function V
C
i (·, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) admits the two-sided
directional derivative at θi in the direction of d ∈ IR
ki . Thus, Property A is satisfied.
Q.E.D.
This theorem corresponds to Theorem 1 of Carbajal (2010). Additionally, we can pro-
vide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms on restricted
domains, which corresponds to Corollary 1 of Carbajal (2010). Note that the family
17
{V Ci (·, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) : Θi → IR|θ−i ∈ Θ−i, θ¯i ∈ Θi} is said to be pointwise bounded on
Θi if, for each θi ∈ Θi, the set of real numbers {V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))}θ
−i∈Θ−i,θ¯i∈Θi
is
bounded.
Corollary 1. Assume that Θi is an open, convex bounded subset of IR
ki and that the
domain of player i’s total valuations {V Ci (·, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) : Θi → IR|θ−i ∈ Θ−i, θ¯i ∈
Θi} is a collection of pointwise bounded, convex functions on Θi. Then, any dynamic
direct mechanism which is outcome efficient and periodic ex-post incentive compatible is a
dynamic Groves mechanism.
Proof: We omit the proof since it is almost identical to that in Carbajal (2010). Q.E.D.
As Holmstro¨m (1979) states, it is conceivable that uniqueness would be lost when the
domain is restricted. Compared to Cavallo’s (2008) result for the unrestricted domain,
this corollary shows the uniqueness result for a restricted domain.17 Observe that in many
interesting economic applications, including the repeated auctions and nonlinear pricing
models, the domain of valuations is indeed restricted and further satisfies the conditions
of Corollary 1.18 We illustrate this point with a simple nonlinear pricing example.
Example 1. There is a single player who is interested in a good that a monopolist pro-
duces. Since there is only one player, we drop the subscript in this example for notational
convenience. Let Θ = (0, 1) and A = [0, 1]. Note that we have a one-dimensional type
space in this example. The (one-period) valuation function is given as v(θ, a) = θa, where
a is the probability that the player gets the good. Let c denote the constant marginal cost
of producing the good. Thus, an efficient decision rule is such that a∗(θ) = 1 when θ ≥ c
and a∗(θ) = 0 otherwise. The transition kernel is given as follows: Let ω = {ωt}∞t=1 be a
17 Cavallo follows the method of proof in Green and Laffont (1977), which rests crucially on the
assumption of a large domain of valuations to establish the uniqueness.
18 We refer the reader to page 1115 of Krishna and Maenner (2001) for this observation.
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sequence of independently and identically distributed random variables on (−1, 1) and let
θt+1 =


γθt + (1− γ)ωt+1 if 0 < θt+1 < 1;
γθt + (1− γ)ωt+1 − 1 if θt+1 > 1;
γθt + (1− γ)ωt+1 + 1 if θt+1 < 0,
where γ is a real number in (0, 1).19 We have ∂θt/∂θ0 = γt and ∂V D(θ0, a∗(θ¯0), ω)/∂θ0 =
∑∞
t=0 δ
tγta∗(θ¯t). Hence, V C(θ0, a∗(θ¯0)) is linear in θ0, as well as other conditions of
Corollary 1 are satisfied.20
Theorem 2 also immediately implies that the uniqueness result holds when the domain
of player i’s total valuations {V Ci (·, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i)) : Θi → IR|θ−i ∈ Θ−i, θ¯i ∈ Θi} is a
collection of pointwise bounded, continuously differentiable functions on an open connected
subset Θi of IR
ki .
4 Conclusion
With a careful specification of dynamic environments, we have examined necessary and
sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms. We first assumed
that the set Θi of types and the set A of actions are Borel spaces and showed that dynamic
Groves mechanisms are outcome efficient and periodic ex-post incentive compatible. Next,
with the additional assumptions that Θi is an open connected subset of IR
ki and the domain
Vi of player i’s total valuations consists of V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θ¯i, θ−i))’s that are equi-Lipschitz
continuous and regular on Θi, we have provided necessary and sufficient conditions for the
uniqueness of dynamic Groves mechanisms. This is an extension of the results in Carbajal
(2010) to the dynamic setting.
We have obtained the uniqueness result for stationary Markovian environments. We
have utilized the recursive structure and also employed the results in the Markov decision
process literature, in particular, for the existence and sufficiency of deterministic stationary
19 We can assign θt+1 to any value in (0, 1) for the measure-zero event of θt+1 = 0 or 1.
20 Note that θt’s are independent across periods when γ = 0 and perfectly correlated when γ = 1. It
is easy to see that V C(θ0, a∗(θ¯0)) is linear in θ0 as well for these cases.
19
policies. It is a future research agenda to extend the uniqueness result to more general
(i.e., non-stationary non-Markovian) dynamic environments. ‘
Appendix
Definition of ex-post incentive compatibility: A mechanism {aˆt, zˆt}∞t=0 is periodic
ex-post incentive compatible if ∀i, ∀t, ∀ht−1, ∀at−1, ∀(θti , θ
t
−i), and ∀r
t
i :
vi(θ
t
i , aˆ
t(ht−1, at−1, θti , θ
t
−i))− zˆ
t
i(h
t−1, at−1, θti , θ
t
−i)
+δ
∫
Θ
(
vi(θ
t+1
i , aˆ
t+1(ht+1))− zˆt+1i (h
t+1)
)
p(dθt+1|θt, aˆt(ht−1, at−1, θti, θ
t
−i))
+δ2
∫
Θ
∫
Θ
(
vi(θ
t+2
i , aˆ
t+2(ht+2))− zt+2i (h
t+2)
)
p(dθt+2|θt+1, aˆt+1(ht+1))
× p(dθt+1|θt, aˆt(ht−1, at−1, θti , θ
t
−i)) + · · ·
≥vi(θ
t
i , aˆ
t(ht−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i))− zˆ
t
i (h
t−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i)
+δ
∫
Θ
(
vi(θ
t+1
i , aˆ
t+1(h
t+1
))− zˆt+1i (h
t+1
)
)
p(dθt+1|θt, aˆt(ht−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i))
+δ2
∫
Θ
∫
Θ
(
vi(θ
t+2
i , aˆ
t+2(h
t+2
))− zt+2i (h
t+2
)
)
p(dθt+2|θt+1, aˆt+1(h
t+1
))
× p(dθt+1|θt, aˆt(ht−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i)) + · · · ,
where we define
ht+1 = (ht−1, at−1, θti , θ
t
−i, aˆ
t(ht−1, at−1, θti , θ
t
−i), θ
t+1); ht+2 = (ht+1, aˆt+1(ht+1), θt+2);
h
t+1
= (ht−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i, aˆ
t(ht−1, at−1, rti , θ
t
−i), θ
t+1); h
t+2
= (h
t+1
, aˆt+1(h
t+1
), θt+2).
Proof of Lemma 1: For any two distinct θi and θˆi in Θi, we have
Ui(θi, θ−i)− Ui(θˆi, θ−i) ≤ U
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− U
C
i (θˆi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
=V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− V
C
i (θˆi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) ≤ Li||θi − θˆi||
where the first inequality follows from periodic ex-post incentive compatibility and the
second inequality follows from equi-Lipschitz continuity. Reversing the roles of θi and θˆi,
we have |Ui(θi, θ−i)−Ui(θˆi, θ−i)| ≤ Li||θi− θˆi||. Hence, Ui(θi, θ−i) is Lipschitz continuous
on Θi. A similar argument holds for W (θi, θ−i). Being Lipschitz functions defined on an
20
open connected set Θi ⊆ IR
ki , the functions Ui andW are differentiable almost everywhere
on Θi. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Given θ−i, we have
W (θi + λd, θ−i)−W (θi, θ−i)
≥V Ci (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i)) + V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
−V Ci (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− V
C
−i(θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
=V Ci (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
where the inequality follows from the definition of the total social welfare function W :
Θ→ IR. Thus, if λ > 0 we have
V Ci (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
λ
≤
W (θi + λd, θ−i)−W (θi, θ−i)
λ
,
whereas if λ < 0 we have
V Ci (θi + λd, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))− V
C
i (θi, θ−i, a
∗(θi, θ−i))
λ
≥
W (θi + λd, θ−i)−W (θi, θ−i)
λ
.
IfW (θi, θ−i) is regular at θi, we get the desired results as we let λ ↓ 0 and λ ↑ 0 respectively.
Q.E.D.
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